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HOSPITAL EMERGENCY SERVICE AND
THE OPEN DOOR
Leonard S. Powers*
I.

INTRODUCTION

to its antecedents, the modern hospital is a revolutionary institution. Until this century the community hospital
was little more than a rooming house to which the transient sick were
taken and from which most never left. It served to isolate, with
minimum care, those who could not afford medical treatment at
home, especially those with contagious diseases who could be a
burden and threat to the well. Today, the hospital is a complex
center of activity-a vast assemblage of superbly trained and highly
specialized talent and expensive equipment devoted to healing those
suffering from accident or disease. No longer is it only for the impoverished sick; all strata of our society come to it and all demand
that the very best in medical technology and skill be available to
them.1 And as the complexity and expense of operating the hospitals
increased, they began to take on a distinctly business-like appearance
much unlike that of the earlier charity-oriented organizations. One
significant aspect of this development was the eventual demise of the
charitable immunity doctrine as applied to hospitals.2
One department of the hospital subjected to especially rapid
change in recent years has been the emergency service. Every section
of the country notes a tremendous increase in public demand for
emergency room services.3 That "the public has taken to the emer-
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1. See HOSPITALS, DOCTORS, AND THE PUBUC INTEREST 293 (J. Knowles ed. 1965);
Davis, The Hospital's Position in American Society, in MODERN CONCEPTS OF HOSPITAL
ADMINISTRATION 7-16 (J. Owen ed. 1962).
2. For a detailed analysis of the status of the doctrine in the various states see
Annot., 25 A.L.R.2d 29 (1952); 3 A.L.R.2d Later Case Service 741 (1965). The reasons
for the change undoubtedly arise from the changing pattern of financial support for
hospitals. See Haynes v. Presbyterian Hosp. Ass'n, 241 Iowa 1269, 45 N.W.2d 151, 154
(1950); President and Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810, 824
(D.C. Cir. 1942); Davis, supra note 1, at 11.
3. In an Ohio study over an eight-year period, the increase per year ranged from
10% to almost 20%. See Seifert &: Johnstone, Meeting the Emergency Department
Crisis, 40 HOSPITALS 55 (1966). The American Hospital Association found a 175%
increase in emergency room visits between 1954 and 1964. A.M.A. Department of
Hospitals and Medical Facilities, The Emergency Department Problem-An Overview,
198 J.A.M.A. 380 (1966) [hereinafter 198 J.A.M.A.]. The increase for some hospitals
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gency department like a duck to water" 4 is certainly no exaggeration;
it may be an understatement. While the propriety of such a magnified role for the emergency room in the total treatment context is
far from clear, and, indeed, is the subject of a continuing dialogue
within the medical profession, 5 the increased emphasis is already with
us. Like the shift in hospital practices which led to the rapid demise
of the charitable immunity doctrine, so will this development force
changes in the law. This Article will focus on the emerging duty of
hospital emergency rooms to treat patients seeking their aid. 6
Before discussing that question, it is helpful to examine the
changes in emergency room practices in greater detail. The emergency room was originally what its name implies-a place for the
treatment of severe injuries and diseases demanding immediate attention. 7 Its location was usually in some remote part of the hospital.
It had no organizational status as a department, and the quality of
care rendered there was usually below the general standard for the
hospital. 8 The emergency room of a modem hospital is a drastically
different place. 9 Now the public goes to the emergency room for
has been as high as 600% in six years. See Stichter, Medical Staffing of Emergency
Rooms: Legal and Ethical Considerations, 62 THE OHIO STATE MEDICAL J. 600 (1966);
Foster, Public Discovers Where Care Is: Emergency Rooms, 106 THE MoDERN HosPITAL 77 (1966).
4. Blalock, Emergency Care, 40 HOSPITALS at 51 (1966).
5. For example, see Bergen, Legal Aspects of Emergency Departments, in EMER·
GENCY DEPARTMENT 109 (1966): "Emergency medical care might be defined as care
necessary to sustain life or maintain health that cannot be delayed"; Letourneau,
Legal Aspects of the Hospital Emergency Room, 16 CLEv.-MAR. L. R.Ev. 50 (1967).
6. "Private Hospital" as used herein means any hospital which is not a public
hospital. A public hospital is one owned, operated, and supported by government. Van
Campen v. Olean Gen. Hosp., 210 App. Div. 204, 205 N.Y.S. 554, aff'd, 239 N.Y. 615,
147 N.E. 219 (1924). The responsibility of public hospitals will be treated to the extent not governed by statute since the common-law duties are, in general, the same
for both public and private hospitals except where changed by statute. While some
statutes creating public hospitals do not specifically grant persons the right to be
admitted, they do state requirements that may by implication create rights of admission to such hospitals. Such admission requirements typically relate to residence and
financial status of the person seeking admission. An occasional statute provides that
governmental hospitals are for "the benefit of the inhabitants of such county and of
any person falling sick or being injured or maimed within its limits." FLA. STAT.
§ 155.16 (1965). Under such provisions, hospitals may be under a duty to admit persons
for emergency treatment.
·
7. Stichter, supra note 3, at 600.
8. Meyer, The Hospital Emergency Department-New Functions and Responsi•
bilities, 40 PoSTGRAD. MEDICINE 374 (1966). For many years it has been the weakest and
most neglected department in the hospital. 198 J.A.M.A. 380. For a comparison of in•
patient and outpatient services see Seifert &: Johnstone, supra note 3, at 57.
9. The change has been expressed as follows: "From a single room with one or two
treatment tables, a few intravenous stands, and perhaps a cabinet of drugs, the 'emer•
gency room' has now expanded into a many-chambered area with facilities for many
types of examination and treatment." Noer, Critical Surgery Belongs in O.R., Not E.R.,
106 THE Mon. HosP. 92 (1966).
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treatment of all kinds of injuries and illnesses.10 The number and
volume of services demanded have resulted in some emergency rooms
becoming, in effect, complete miniature hospitals.11 The United
States Public Health Service predicts 49.3 million annual emergency
room visits by 1970 compared to only 32.1 million ordinary hospital
admissions. This is a 79 per cent increase, per 1,000 population, in
the use of the emergency room compared to an 8 per cent increase
in ordinary admissions over the 1960 figures. 12
It is quite clear, then, that the public considers the emergency
room to be a community medical center. 13 It is the only place where
the best equipment and facilities and at least some care are available
on any day, at any hour, and without appointment. It does not require the presence of the sometimes unavailable family doctor.14 In
fact, one explanation for this development is undoubtedly the concurrent disappearance of the traditional family doctor and the house
call, and the advent of the clinic, regular office hours, and doctors'
days off.
Yielding to the demands of the public and to the changing structure of their profession, some physicians and hospital administrators
have challenged the profession to bring about a wholesale expansion
of emergency facilities and organization.15 There are those who feel
that no one who comes to the emergency room desiring treatment
should be turned away-even if no true emergency exists. There is
a feeling that what may not be an "emergency" to the physician may
nevertheless be one for the patient and that hospitals must accept
IO. Blalock, supra note 4, at 51-52.
11. Noer, supra note 9, at 92.
12. U.S. DEP'T. OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND .WELFARE, HOSPITAL OUTPATIENT SERVICES: FACTS AND TRENDS, PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE 14-15 (No. 930-C-6 1964).
13. This development has caused some to characterize the emergency room as a
"neighborhood drop-in clinic." Stichter, supra note 3, at 600.
14. Many explanations for the new pattern of emergency room use are given.
Stichter feels the major reason is "the public's general acceptance . • • of the idea
that hospital facilities ••• should be available for all kinds of illnesses and injuriesthe idea that the hospital emergency room should be a sort of community medical
center." Stichter, supra note 3, at 601. For other explanations, see MODERN CONCEPTS
OF HOSPITAL .ADMINISTRATION, supra note I, at 330; Vaughan &: Gamester, Why Patients
Use Hospital Emergency Departments, 40 HoSPs. 59 (1966); 198 J.A.M.A. 380; Seifert &:
Johnstone, supra note 3, at 58.
15. Foster, supra note 3, at 78. Faced with overwhelming demand, many hospitals
have been modifying their emergency room physical plants, staff arrangements, and
technical services. While the quality of care has been improved, there is as yet no
generally accepted procedure for rendering emergency care. The immediate concern
of the patient centers on the competency, efficiency, and speed of the service rendered
to him, particularly if he has a true emergency. His welfare depends directly upon
the emergency room procedure, i.e., whether it calls for care or evaluation by a nurse,
intern, or licensed physician and whether it provides for rapid and efficient rendition
of service.
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the public's conception of the emergency room as a place to get
medical aid rapidly with a minimum of administrative complication.
Others, resisting extension into nonemergency cases, admonish their
colleagues to return the emergency room to its original function.
Attempts have been made to re-educate the public concerning the
true function of the emergency room, 16 but the public, now accustomed to relying on the hospital emergency room for these vital
services, has not been willing to be re-educated.17
There is some agreement, however, on what an ideal emergency
room should be. First, if there is reasonable doubt whether medical
care beyond "first-aid" is required, this judgment should be made
by a licensed physician.18 Some cases are obviously not emergencies
and are not presented or claimed to be such. These "first-aid" cases
do not require treatment by a licensed physician; anyone can give
such aid within the limits of his competency. Whether these cases will
be treated by the emergency staff or redirected to more suitable
sources of assistance depends on the defined role of that particular
center. But where an "emergency" is claimed, at least the determination should never be made by a nurse, orderly, aide, or clerk. Many
hospitals in practice go beyond this minimal requirement and require treatment of emergency room cases by a licensed physician.19
There is general agreement that a patient presenting himself to the
emergency room should not be dismissed, discharged, or transferred
without the approval of a .licensed physician.20
Yet it is clear from scattered comments and some reported cases
that many emergency rooms do not provide the services of a licensed
16. A Maryland hospital used radio announcements, newspaper stories, and brochures. Foster, supra note 3, at 78. For an account of another attempt to cope with
the problem see How One Small Hospital Enlarged Emergency Room, 106 THE MoD.
HOSP. 87 (1966); T. FUNT, EMERGENCY TREATMENT AND MANAGEMENT 3 (3d ed. 1964):
the ratio between urgent and nonurgent cases is as high as ten to one. • • • As a
result, facilities designed, equipped and staffed for handling emergency conditions have been swamped with nonurgent patients at times when care of true
emergencies suddenly and unexpectedly has become imperative.
17. The reason for the public's attitude has been compared to the thiefs reply to
why he robbed banks: "Because that's where the money is." Foster, supra note 3, at 78.
18. See Bergen, supra note 5, at 110.
19. Stichter, supra note 3, at 604; MODERN CONCEPTS OF HOSPITAL ADMINISTRATION,
supra note 1, at 333; Letourneau, supra note 5, at 57; T. Flint, supra note 16, at 88.
20. E. HAYT, LAW OF HOSPITAL AND NURSE 112 (1958); MODERN CONCEPTS OF HosPITAL ADMINISTRATION, supra note 1, at 333. One emergency treatment system development is the type instituted in the Yale-New Haven Hospital in 1963. This "medical
triage" system emphasizes the screening of true emergencies from cases in which time
is not of the essence by physicians. This system appears successful in increasing efficiency and the quality of patient care, [Weiner, Rutzen, &: Pearson, Effects of Medical
"Triage" in Hospital Emergency Service, 80 PUB. HEALTH REP. 389 (1965)] but it has
not been adopted as standard procedure on a national scale by hospitals nor has it
been required by law.
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physician.21 In three cases that resulted in death, nurses turned
people away from the emergency room without being seen by an
intern, resident, or staff physician.22 In other cases, patients were
transferred23 or discharged24 by interns without examination or approval by a physician. Where a physician was summoned for
treatment or decision, there may have been undue delay. 25 Even
where a physician ordered discharge, there have been instances in
which he was ignorant of the patient's condition.26
The most shocking aspect of the emergency room situation, however, is not the inadequate procedure or substandard quality of care
provided, but the fact that these vital services are not necessarily
available to the stricken patient who presents himself for emergency
care. Following the traditional common-law rule that there is no
affirmative duty to render emergency aid to another human being
who is in peril, private and most public hospitals may legally refuse
aid in an emergency case.27 This rule, rather surprising in this context, is mitigated by the stated standards of the medical profession
which are directed toward providing prompt and effective aid to all
emergency patients. 28
Surely no emergency treatment has even been denied solely because of the legal right of the hospital to refuse treatment. It is to be
21. Seifert &: Johnstone, supra note 3, at 58: "[T]he physical presence of competent,
licensed physicians in hospital emergency departments currently is in the process of
changing the community standards of emergency medical service in hospitals."
22. Wilmington Gen. Hosp. v. Manlove, 53 Del. 338, 169 A.2d 18, afj'd on other
grounds, 54 Del. 15, 174 A.2d 135 (1961); Ruvio v. North Broward Hosp. Dist., 186
S.2d ·15 (4th Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1966); O'Neill v. Montefiore Hosp., 11 App. Div. 2d 132,
202 N.Y.S.2d 436 (1960).
23. Jones v. City of New York, 134 N.Y.S.2d 779 (Sup. Ct. 1954), modified, 286 App.
Div. 825, 143 N.Y.S.2d 628 (1955); Methodist Hosp. v. Ball, 50 Tenn. App. 460, 362
S.W.2d 475 (1961).
24. Bourgeois v. Dade County, 99 S.2d 575 (Fla. 1957).
25. The standard established by the American College of Surgeons calls for treatment by a physician within 15 minutes after arrival in the emergency room. Standards for Emergency Department in Hospital, 48 BULLETIN OF THE AMERICAN COLLEGE
OF SURGEONS 112 (1963). In Huffman v. Lindquist, 37 Cal. 2d 465, 234 P.2d 34 (1951),
nine hours elapsed before the physician first saw the patient who had suffered a
fractured skull in an automobile wreck.
26. Reeves v. North Broward Hosp. Dist., 191 S.2d 307, 308 (4th Dist. Ct. App.
Fla. 1966): "Dr. Moorhead ••• did not see or treat Eddie but signed his discharge
slip.''
27. Birmingham Baptist Hosp. v. Crews, 229 Ala. 398, 157 S. 224 (1934); Olander
v. Johnson, 258 Ill. App. 89 (1930); McDonald v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 120 Mass.
432, 21 Am. R. 529 (1876).
28. Letourneau, supra note 5, at 51, notes that all statements of standards seem to
agree that emergency room arrangements should insure promptness or immediacy of
care. The standards of The Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals require
that the emergency service provide "adequate medical and nursing personnel available
at all times.'' AMERICAN HOSPITAL AssOCIATION, HOSPITAL ACCREDITATION REFERENCES
137 (1964).
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expected, on the other hand, that treatment might be refused if the
case is nonemergent or if the emergency facilities are full. There
have, however, been other reasons given for failure to give emergency
room treatment which do not comport so readily with the physician's
creed: lack of referral to the hospital, membership in a disfavored
medical insurance group, 29 pre-emergency care by another doctor,30
or contagious disease. 31 Other grounds of refusal to treat include
discrimination on grounds of race, emergency room personnel being
unable to locate a physician, or simply that the facility is closed.32
Whatever the emergency room's status as part of the hospital
organization, the quality of care given, or the procedures followed,
most of those charged with the operation of hospitals are aware of
the new role thrust upon the emergency room. Many administrators
and physicians are motivated by a :recognition that the public is
entitled to better service than is presently available.33 Our question
concerns how the law will cope with the expectations of the public
and the generally sympathetic response of hospital officials and the
healing professions. What should the law require as a minimum,
with a tort action against the hospital becoming available if that
minimum is not met? We begin with the shocking proposition that
present law in most American jurisdictions is said to permit a hospital to keep its doors closed to the person seeking emergency medical
aid.

II.

PRESENT STATE OF THE LAW

A. The General Common-Law Rule and its Exceptions

Whether a hospital must render emergency medical services to
the sick and injured is a question residing in that branch of tort law
relating to coming to the aid of someone in peril. It will be helpful,
therefore, to examine briefly some of the general principles that
have emerged in this area.
Basic to the older common law was the distinction between action
and inaction-benveen misfeasance and nonfeasance. Liability was
29. O'Neill v. Montefiore Hosp., 11 App. Div. 2d 132, 202 N.Y.S.2d 436 (1960).
30. Wilmington Gen. Hosp. v. Manlove, 53 Del. 338, 169 A.2d 18, afj'd on other
grounds, 54 Del. 15, 174 A.2d 135 (1961).
31. Birmingham Baptist Hosp. v. Crews, 229 Ala. 398, 157 S. 224 (1934).
32. Horty, Emergency Care-or Lack of It-Can Make a General Hospital Liable,
96 THE Moo. HosP. 106 (1961). Statutory prohibitions against racial and religious discrimination prohibit exclusion from admission on such criteria, but do not in themselves create a right to be admitted.
33. Churchill, The Development of the Hospital, in THE HOSPITAL IN CONTEMPORARY LIFE 68 (N. Faxon ed. 1949); Stichter, supra note 3, at 601.
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imposed for intentional or negligent misfeasance but not for nonfeasance or failure to act. Affirmative action resulting in harm to
another was a breach of duty resulting in liability but mere
failure to intervene to benefit another-even to save him from
serious harm-was not considered actionable since there was no duty
to act in the first instance.34 Justification for this distinction has been
found in the individualistic philosophy of the traditional common
law; it refused to restrict a man's freedom by imposing a sort of
forced labor in the form of a duty to be helpful to those in distress. 35
Charity began and ended at home, and even there, as evidenced by
the family immunities, there was very little.
As social institutions and relationships became more complex,
the courts were required to reconsider the subtle problem of inaction. Liability slowly developed for nonfeasance under some circumstances; where warranted, judicial exceptions developed to the
general rule of no liability for nonfeasance.
One exception developed in cases in which the defendant engaged in some sort of prior affirmative action placing the plaintiff
in peril.36 There had long been a duty to come to the aid of another
if one tortiously put another person in peril, but this, of course, could
be characterized as misfeasance. The duty has been significantly extended to those who innocently cause such bodily harm to another
as to leave him helpless and in danger of further harm.37 Further, if
by one's prior affirmative act a force is innocently set in motion
which threatens peril, then he must act to prevent the risk from
taking effect.38 The common thread that knits these situations together is the defendant's connection with the risk that has thrust the
plaintiff into a position of peril.
A second execption to the no duty to act rule developed where
the defendant undertook to confer a benefit upon another, and that
person suffered harm because of his reliance upon the undertaking.39
Even when there is no prior contractual duty to engage in the undertaking, certain duties are assumed when such a voluntary undertaking begins. To take a well-known example, a railroad which undertakes to maintain a traffic signalman at a street crossing takes on the

w.

34.
PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE
(SECOND} OF TORTS § 314 (1965).

I.Aw OF TORTS 334 (3d ed. 1964); REsTATEMENT

35. Note, The Failure To Rescue: A Comparative Study, 52 C0Lu11r. L. REv. 631
(1952.)
36. For a classification similar to that presented here see 2 F. HARPER &: F. JAMES,
THE I.Aw OF TORTS § 18.6 (1956).
37. REsl"ATEllrENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 322 (1965).
38. Id. § 321; W. PROSSER, supra note 34, at 338.
39. REsTATElltENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 (1965).
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duty to perform that function with due care.40 Liability extends
beyond misfeasance in affirmative acts undertaken to include liability
for negligent failure to perform the undertaking at all when performance was reasonably to be expected. The duty to continue to aid
another who is helpless when a discontinuance would leave the other
in a worse position than when the defendant took charge of him is
within this exception.41
A third exception bases a duty to act upon some special relationship-some special dependence-between the defendant and the
person in peril. There are duties to aid and protect imposed
upon employers,42 common carriers, innkeepers, and invitors, 43 but
other relationships of dependence may also impose a similar duty as,
for example, public utility and customer. Most of these special relationships are found where there is a contractual relationship between the parties, or at least a potentiality of contract.
The residual applicability of the general rule after these exceptions have taken their due may be illustrated by the hypothetical
familiar to all first-year law students: a man walking along a river
bank sees a small child drowning in shallow water but ignores its
calls for help even though he is a competent swimmer. This may be
cruel and morally wrong, but there is no legal duty to rescue. Here,
there is a completely fortuitous chain of events which places one
person in a situation where he has the power to alleviate the distress
of another. This is the factual situation where the courts and commentators still assert that there is no legal duty to assist the one in
peril.
Liability for failure to aid another in peril, then, cannot today
be determined without full appreciation of the factual context.
Slight variations in facts bring important exceptions into operation;
these exceptions, in turn, permit recovery where the general rule
would deny it. Therefore, it is important to know how the courts
have categorized the encounters between persons suffering medical
emergencies and the hospitals maintaining emergency services.

B. Recent Hospital Cases-An Overview
The general rule has been stated to be that persons do not
possess any right to be admitted to a hospital and that a hospital is
40. Erie R.R. v. Stewart, 40 F.2d 855
(1930).
41. R.EsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
42. R.EsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
43. R.EsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §

(6th Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 843
324 (1965).
314(b) (1965).
314A (1965).
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not obliged to accept a patient not desired by it nor even to assign
a reason for refusal to admit. 44 As the rule is stated, there is no exception for medical emergencies or emergency rooms. This rule is
said to apply to all private hospitals and to public hospitals in the
absence of a statutory duty.
Most of the statutes creating rights to treatment apply only
to public hospitals. One exception is the Illinois statute, which
imposes a duty-applicable both to public and private hospitals
where surgical operations are performed-to give emergency medical
treatment or first aid to any person who applies.45 Most statutes authorizing the creation of governmental hospitals limit hospital use
to persons with some defined relationship to the governmental unit
supporting the institution.46 A person coming within the statutory
class probably has an implied right to admission although the statutes
create no express right. Some statutes provide for waiver of the
normal admission requirements for treatment in emergency cases.47
If this is so, then absent some statute, it would seem to follow
that a hospital cannot be held civilly liable for nonadmittance and
consequent nontreatment. Yet, in nine out of eleven recent cases to
be discussed below the courts held the hospital liable. Although in
three of the nine cases the hospital may have done something it
should not have done,48 in at least six of the cases it appears that the
courts found that the hospital should have done something which it
failed to do. 49 On one theory or another, exceptions to the general
rule were found to exist. The theory most frequently used has been
the concept of a voluntary undertaking to render aid. The opinions,
unfortunately, generally fail to specify the essential elements which
amount to an undertaking or the extent of the duty assumed once
44. Birmingham Baptist Hosp. v. Crews, 229 Ala. 398, 157 S. 224 (1934). Opinions in
other emergency room cases usually begin with a statement that this is a general rule.
45. !LL. REv. STAT. ch. 111½ §§ 86-87 (1966). Although the statute contains only a
criminal penalty for failure to comply, a duty to provide care could be based upon it
so as to result in civil liability on a defendant hospital violating it.
46. COLO. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. § 124-4-3 (1953); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 155.16 (1965).
47. ARIZ. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. § ll-297A (1956); N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAws § 7301 (McKinney 1961). This type of statutory provision may imply that the public hospital should
treat all emergency cases without screening for the statutory requirements.
48. Bourgeois v. Dade County, 99 S.2d 575 (Fla. 1957); Reeves v. North Broward
Hospital District, 191 S.2d 307 (4th Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1966); Barcia v. Society of New
York Hospital, 39 Misc. 2d 526, 241 N.Y.S.2d 373 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
49. Wilmington Gen. Hospital v. Manlove, 53 Del. 338, 169 A.2d 18, afj'd on other
grounds, 54 Del. 15, 174 A.2d 135 (1961); Le Jeune Road Hospital, Inc. v. Watson, 171
S,2d 202 (Ct. App. Fla. 1965); New Biloxi Hospital, Inc. v. Frazier, 245 Miss. 185, 146
S,2d 882 (1962); O'Neill v. Montefiore Hospital, 11 App. Div.2d 132, 202 N.Y.S.2d 436
(1960); Jones v. City of New York, 134 N.Y.S.2d 779 (Sup. Ct. 1954), modified, 143
N.Y.S.2d 628 (App. Div. 1955); Methodist Hospital v. Ball, 50 Tenn. App. 460, 362
S,W.2d 475 (1961).
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an undertaking is found to have occurred. The legal obligations of
the hospital confronting a medical emergency, then, have not been
adequately formulated.
This sort of conceptual uncertainty is not uncommon where the
courts are confronted with seriously conflicting policies. The urge
to deny any duty to render aid springs from the individualistic notion that one should be able to set one's own policies for rendering a
gratuitous service. The existence of a duty might also impose a
tremendous burden on smaller hospitals, draining financial and
manpower resources to the point of forcing some of these institutions to abandon the emergency service altogether. While liability
insurance might soften the financial blow, the adverse publicity
generated by allowing such suits could be equally damaging. On
the other hand, ethical and moral pressures to assist another human
being in an emergency have strong appeal in such cases. The result
of a hospital's lack of treatment is often serious: in all but one of the
eleven cases death ensued.
Conceptual difficulties aside, it appears that the general rule of
no duty to render aid is not actually shielding hospitals from civil
liability in emergency room cases, and this is a reliable indication of
judicial dissatisfaction with that rule. A narrow path must be
walked if hospital liability is to be avoided. Indeed, there may be no
reliable path. In at least one jurisdiction the only sure way to avoid
liability is apparently to accept the person in distress who appears at
the emergency room and render with due care whatever emergency
assistance is necessary. 50 On similar facts one other jurisdiction has
reached the same result in substance if not in theory. 51 How close
other courts will come to imposing liability for turning patients
away at the door is uncertain because few of these cases arise. Hospitals do not ordinarily turn away summarily those who appear asking for emergency aid; thus there are no modern cases for the general
rule to operate upon. Each case seems to fit an exception.

C. Recent Hospital Cases-A Factual Analysis
The eleven recent cases mentioned earlier comprise much of the
authority on the subject of hospital liability for nontreatment. Since
the facts of each case are critical in determining whether some exception to the general rule is applicable, each case will be discussed in
some detail. Certain factual patterns, however, are discernible and
50. See Wilmington Gen. Hosp. v. Manlove, 53 Del. 338, 169 A.2d 18, aff'd on other
grounds, 54 Del. 15, 174 A.2d 135 (1961).
51. O'Neill v. Montefiore Hosp., 11 App. Div. 2d 132, 202 N.Y.S.2d 436 (1960).
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form a framework for analysis. The eleven cases, then, fit into five
factual patterns.

I. After the hospital exercised control, it gave some aid to the
applicant and then released him with the mutual understanding
that he was in no better condition than before.

Birmingham Baptist Hospital v. Crews. 52 A child suffering from
diphtheria was taken to a private hospital. The house physician rendered treatment, consisting of a throat swab, oxygen, and two injections of antitoxin. There was a dispute concerning whether the antitoxin temporarily weakened the child's condition. After this treatment the superintendent required the family to take the child home
because hospital regulations forbade accepting patients with contagious diseases. Within fifteen minutes after returning home the
child died.
Crews, which denied recovery to the plaintiff, was the first important case on the question in the recent past. It is usually cited as
the leading case for the general rule that there is no right to be admitted to a private hospital. Because it did not deal with the failure
to give emergency aid to a person coming to the emergency room, it
is precise authority only on the question of the duty of a hospital to
admit a person for ordinary hospital services. In fact, the court
found that emergency treatment had been provided by the hospital;
the issue was whether the hospital had a duty to provide more than
that. While recognizing that a hospital may create a duty to provide
even ordinary hospital services by undertaking to act, the court
provided no guidelines as to how or when such a duty comes into
existence. It merely held that rendering emergency care alone will
not create a duty to render ordinary, nonemergency, hospital services, especially when the patient is suffering from a contagious disease.
Crews is an example of rendering aid and sending the patient
away with the mutual understanding that he is in no better condition than before treatment. It is completely consistent with the general tort law with respect to the duty to aid one in peril. The hospital
provided aid and, although its help conferred no particular benefit,
it did not make the condition worse. Crews cannot be regarded as a
case of failure to admit or failure to render emergency aid; if a
·wrong was committed, it would be wrongful discharge or abandonment. On the lack of duty to render emergency treatment, the
52. 229 Ala. 398, 157 S. 224 (1934).
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principle for which it has so often been cited, the Crews case contains only dicta. Furthermore, in an age of rapidly expanding medical
facilities and changing socio-institutional attitudes, Crews is thirtyfour years old.
It may be, however, that the Crews rule of no duty to accept a
prospective patient for ordinary hospital services has been extended
by other courts to emergency room services. This is not to say that
such a rule has been applied to limit hospital liability; rather, it is
inferred from the many judicial efforts in emergency room cases to
find some exception to the "general rule." In other words, courts
have generally dealt with emergency room cases as though the Crews
dictum were settled law. One reason for this assumption, of course,
was that it fit into the lack-of-duty position of nonfeasance cases generally.

2. After the hospital exercised control, it kept the applicant for
some period of time without giving aid and then sent him elsewhere for aid.

Methodist Hospital v. Ball. 53 A young automobile accident victim
was carried to the emergency room of the hospital at 11 :45 p.m.
Another person, not involved in the accident, was considered by an
intern to be more in need of immediate attention and was given the
only available bed in the hospital. The intern in charge examined
the boy's abdomen and checked his pulse and blood pressure but gave
no further medical attention. No licensed physician was called. When
the boy attempted to leave his stretcher, several hospital employees
assisted in holding him down, with one person applying pressure to
his back. After forty-five minutes at the defendant hospital, the boy
was taken to another hospital where he died at 1:00 a.m. from a ruptured liver and internal bleeding.
New Biloxi Hospital, Inc. v. Frazier. 54 A man, bleeding profusely
from a gunshot wound in the arm, was taken to the emergency room
of the hospital. Three nurses saw his condition but did nothing to
stop the bleeding. The head nurse called a doctor but did not inform
him of the extent of the bleeding. The doctor examined the man
but did not stop the bleeding. On learning that the patient was a
veteran, the doctor made arrangements for his transfer to a veteran's
hospital and left him with the head nurse. The nurse was to advise
the doctor of changes in the patient's condition. In spite of shock
53. 50 Tenn. App. 460, 362 S.W.2d 475 (Ct. App. 1961).
54. 245 Miss. 185, 146 S.2d 882 (1962).
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symptoms, however, she made no report to the doctor. After two
hours in the emergency room, the patient was transferred to the
veteran's hospital where he died within a half hour from hemorrhage
and shock.
Tacit adherence to the Crews Draconian principle probably
accounts for the conclusion in these two cases that the deceased
had been legally accepted as a "patient." 55 Neither opinion, however, offers a satisfactory explanation of how one becomes a patient or why a patient deserves better treatment in a medical emergency than one who, though a nonpatient, is nevertheless physically
present. Hospital personnel in both cases exercised control over the
patient by accepting him into the emergency room with the obvious
intention of rendering some aid, but none was, in fact, rendered. A
voluntary undertaking to render service, standing alone, has not
been sufficient for other courts to find patient status, or it has not
been necessary in order to hold the hospital liable. The only significant difference between these cases and other emergency cases is
that here the persons were kept in the emergency room for a substantial time without receiving any aid and were later transferred
somewhere else to receive the necessary attention. Except for these
two cases, the law appears to be that a person does not achieve
patient status until treatment starts, except in cases of formal admission for general hospital services.
Perhaps Ball and Frazier represent attempts to come within the
exception of voluntary undertaking-assumed duty. The courts may
have been seeking added assurance for their result by finding a
hospital-patient relationship, which means a special dependence
contract and another possible exception to the general nonfeasance
rule. These cases may mean that, if the hospital-patient relationship
exists, the hospital has a duty to render whatever treatment the
condition requires and that admission may occur without any formalities or any treatment. Consider the following language from the
Frazier case:
In an emergency, the victim should be permitted to leave the hospital only after he has been seen, examined and offered reasonable
first aid. A hospital rendering emergency treatment is obligated to
do that which is immediately and reasonably necessary for the preservation of the life, limb, or health of the patient. It should not discharge a patient in critical condition without furnishing or procuring suitable medical attention. 56
55. Cases cited in notes 53 and 54 supra.
56. 245 Miss. 185 at 197, 146 S.2d 882 at 887 (1962).
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In neither case was the injured person formally admitted: in
Ball the deceased received only a superficial examination upon entering the emergency room and was kept forty-five minutes before
being transferred; in Frazier a doctor was summoned and the injured
man's name was recorded, but he remained for nv-o hours. Whether
anything less than forty-five minutes would create the hospital-patient relationship is unclear, but if this is enough, then practically
anyone in distress who gets through the emergency room door may
be a "patient." This may mean that the amazing potency of the dictum in Crews has evaporated, just as privity of contract in defective
products negligence cases disappeared when Judge Cardozo began to
write the opinion in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 51 and for very
similar reasons. The common law regurgitates what it cannot digest.
The results of Ball and Frazier could be rationalized under other
tort rules. If an individual undertakes to aid another and should
recognize that the aid is necessary for the other's protection, he will
be liable for harm resulting from failure to use due care to perform
his undertaking if his failure increases the risk of harm to the other.li 8
The hospitals in both cases materially increased the time before aid
was received. This delay itself might have been a significant factor
in causing death; surely it increased the risk of harm. On this theory
of liability, however, the existence of a hospital-patient relationship
would be unnecessary to liability. Injecting the hospital-patient relationship into the cases makes them appear to be breach of contract
or wrongful discharge cases, and this compounds confusion.
3. After the hospital exercised control, it gave some aid, but
then released the applicant giving him reason to believe the
emergency had passed, when in fact his condition was the same
or had been worsened by the treatment.

Barcia v. Society of New York Hospital. 59 On the advice of a
family physician, the parents of a two-year old girl took her to the
hospital. A physician employed by the hospital gave her an examination, including a chest X-ray, blood count, and throat culture. He
decided that her condition was not critical enough to require hospitalization. The child's condition deteriorated after she returned to
her home. Again she was taken to the hospital on the family phy57. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
58. R.EsTATEMENT {SECOND} OF TORTS § 323 (1965).
59. 39 Misc. 2d 526, 241 N.Y.S.2d 373 (Sup. Ct. 1963).

May 1968]

Hospital Emergency Service

1469

sician's advice. This time she was formally admitted but died several
hours later. Another physician at the hospital asked the parents
"why didn't you bring her sooner, I might have been able to save
her." 60
Reeves v. North Broward Hospital District. 61 The patient was
given a urine test and a blood pressure check by a hospital resident
physician. He diagnosed the case as hypertension and gave the man
sedatives. A relief doctor came on and signed the release of the patient into the custody of two brothers without seeing or treating the
patient. Eleven hours later the man died of a subdural hematoma
en route back to the hospital.
Bourgeois v. Dade County. 62 A man was found unconscious in his
undenvear on the lawn in front of a hotel and was taken by police to
the emergency room of the hospital. An intern found his pulse and
chest sounds normal. The man was unable to give his name or a
history of his condition, and the intern made no other effort to obtain a hisory. No X-rays were taken. There was conflicting testimony
about alcohol on the patient's breath. After a superficial examination,
the intern released the patient to the police as a drunk. Several hours
later he died in a jail cell from punctures of the thoracic cavity by
broken ribs.
Ruvio v. North Broward Hospital District. 63 plaintiff's husband
was taken to the hospital emergency room on a Sunday. Under normal practice the resident physician on duty in the emergency room
screened emergency cases. On Sundays, however, although a physician
was on call, the emergency room nurses screened patients and called
the physician only if there was a question in their minds about the
existence of an emergency. Two nurses refused the applicant admission or any treatment without a doctor's order on the ground that
no emergency existed. A friend took him directly to an outside physician who found him to be an emergency case and had him admitted
to the same hospital. He died two days later of a coronary infarction.
Barcia involves both an undertaking to treat and a negligent
diagnosis, 64 but judgment for the plaintiff was rendered simply on
the basis of negligence-without any discussion of duty to treat. The
case is an example of aid given without due care which unreasonably
60.
61.
62.
63.
6'1.
1963).

39 Misc. 2d at 527, 241 N.Y.S.2d at 375.
191 S.2d 307 (4th Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1966).
99 S.2d 575 (Fla. 1957).
186 S.2d 45 (4th Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1966), cert. denied, 195 S.2d 567 (Fla. 1966).
Barcia v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 39 Misc. 2d 526, 241 N.Y.S.2d 373 (Sup. Ct.
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increases the risk of harm to another by creating a false sense of
security and preventing the person from seeking aid elsewhere. The
delayed admittance due to the initial inaccurate diagnosis was apparently crucial to the patient's chances.
In Reeves there was both negligent diagnosis and negligent treatment. 65 The Florida appellate court reversed a directed verdict for
the defendant on the grounds that the evidence presented a jury question as to whether the hospital "did not exercise such reasonable care
toward the deceased as his known condition required." 66 Perhaps
this means that a hospital taking a patient into the emergency room
may not terminate treatment until it does whatever the patient's true
condition reasonably requires. Reading the case more narrowly, it
may mean that the treatment and diagnosis constitute actionable
neglect only because they created a false sense of security in the
patient and deterred him from seeking other aid. As in Barcia, the
hospital's intervention may have left the patient in a worse condition than he was before. Had the hospital given no aid, he would
perhaps have received the necessary and proper care at another
facility.
Bourgeois61 was also a case of negligent diagnosis. In fact, the
staff pathologist and emergency room supervising physician testified
that improper procedures were followed. Again, recovery for the
plaintiff may be rationalized on the basis of an intervenor who puts
his potential beneficiary in worse condition than he was before. The
hospital personnel not only caused movement and handling by the
police which aggravated the patient's condition, but they also prevented other proper care. In Ruvio, 68 however, a directed verdict for
defendant was affirmed on appeal. Here the time period before death
was substantially longer than in the cases previously discussed. Affirmance was on the grounds that plaintiff failed to prove that any
action or inaction by the hospital staff was the proximate cause of
death or that the hospital staff had breached any duty. There was
no indication, however, that the court thought that no duty to the
deceased existed.
4. After the hospital exercised control, it gave some aid to applicant and sent him elsewhere for further treatment.
65. 191 S.2d 307 (4th Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1966).
66. 191 S.2d at 309.
67. 99 S.2d 575 (Fla. 1957).
68. Ruvio v. North Broward Hosp. Dist., 186 S.2d 45 (4th D. Ct. App. Fla. 1966), cert.
denied, 195 S.2d 567 (1966).
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Le]uene Road Hospital, Inc. v. Watson. 69 A mother took her son
to the hospital for a scheduled appendicitis operation. The boy was
examined, given medication, and dressed in a hospital gown. After
waiting two hours the boy and his mother were required to leave
because the mother could not produce 200 dollars in cash. Although
there was evidence that the boy was violently ill at the time of leaving the hospital, they were obliged to go to another hospital where
the operation was performed.
Jones v. City of New York. 70 The patient suffered an abdominal
stab wound. After examining her and cleaning and dressing the
wound, an emergency room intern arranged for her transfer from
the charitable hospital to a city hospital for further treatment. She
died there during an exploratory operation.
In this factual pattern, unless the examination and treatment
given are negligent, it seems more difficult in legal theory to hold the
hospital liable than in the prior three factual categories. The voluntary undertaking-assumed duty rule in nonhospital contexts is
that the intervenor may terminate his services at any time as long as
he does not leave his intended beneficiary in a worse position. He is
neither required to continue his assistance indefinitely or to do everything it is within his power to do. 71 Both of these cases, nevertheless,
held the hospital liable.
Watson, which is relevant even though not an emergency room
case, avoided the rule of no duty to continue treatment by finding
that the plaintiff had been accepted as a patient. Once patient status
is achieved, a dependent contractual relationship exists and the
patient may not be discharged if the removal aggravates his condition
or increases the risk of harm. The extent of control by the hospital
necessary to create the hospital-patient relationship was not discussed.
In Jones the hospital was held liable on the theory that the deceased was denied necessary treatment at the emergency stage and
that the transfer contributed to her death. The court did not find
that the deceased was a patient. Perhaps the court was saying that
after exercising some control the hospital should have done everything within its power to minister to the person's needs and that it
did not successfully shift that duty to the second hospital. Again,
this seems to be a different voluntary-undertaking rule than that
which applies in the nonhospital context.
69. 171 S.2d 202 (3d Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1965).
70. 134 N.Y.S.2d 779 (Sup. Ct. 1954), modified, 143 N.Y.S.2d 628 (App. Div. 1955).
71. R.EsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 (1965).

1472

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 66:1455

5. The hospital refused to exercise control over the applicant
and did not give any aid. The applicant was turned away at the
door.
O'Neill v. Montefiore Hospital. 72 Plaintiff's husband awoke at
5:00 a.m. experiencing severe chest and arm pains and breathing
difficulties. He dressed and walked with his wife three blocks to the
hospital emergency room. The wife explained to the nurse in charge
that he was very ill, and she thought he was suffering from a heart
attack. Upon discovering that the applicants were members of a
particular insurance plan group, the nurse explained that the hospital did not treat members of that group but offered to call a physician who was associated with the plan. The husband spoke with
that doctor. Exactly what transpired is unknown, but the doctor did
not come to check him or seek his admission to the hospital. At this
point plaintiff requested that her husband be treated by a hospital
doctor since it was an emergency. The nurse disregarded the request
with the explanation that he could see his own physician later in the
morning. The husband died while undressing after returning home.
Wilmington General Hospital v. Manlove. 73 Plaintiff's child had
been under a doctor's care for three days. By the fourth day the child
had not begun to improve. Knowing their physician was not in his
office on that day, the parents took the child to the hospital emergency room. They explained to the nurse that the child had had a
continuously high temperature, diarrhea, and two sleepless nights.
The nurse responded that the hospital could not give any treatment
because of the danger of conflict with the attending physician's
medication. The nurse did not examine the child in any way, but
did make an unsuccessful effort to reach the family physician. She
suggested that they return the next day when the pediatric clinic
opened. The child died from bronchial pneumonia that afternoon
at home.
In these cases, the hospital, rather than exercising any control or
giving any treatment, refused to treat the applicant. One might think
that the argument still open under the general rule of no duty to act
would permit the hospital to escape liability in such circumstances.
None of the general exceptions is applicable here. First, no innocent or negligent conduct of the hospital has caused the peril to the
sick person, and no force threatening peril is under the hospital's
72. 11 App. Div. 132, 202 N.Y.S.2d 436 (1960).
73. 53 Del. 338, 169 A.2d 18, afj'd on other grounds, 54 Del. 15, 174 A.2d 135 (1961).
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control. Second, there has been no undertaking to aid the person in
peril. Third, there is no special relationship of dependence between
the hospital and prospective patient since by all the tests there is no
patient. In both O'Neill and Manlove, as may be guessed from
this elaborate preface, the courts found the hospitals liable.
Both cases had these facts in common: (I) the person seeking aid
was refused examination as well as treatment; (2) the nurse called
a physician for the person; and (3) the individual died shortly after
leaving the hospital. The intermediate New York appellate court in
O'Neill split three to two in reversing a dismissal of plaintiff's claim.
The court found that the evidence was sufficient to create nvo issues
which should have been submitted to the jury: Did the nurse's actions amount to a voluntary undertaking-assumed duty by the hospital to provide medical care, or did she merely perform a personal
favor? And, if the hospital assumed such an obligation, was it reasonably fulfilled? An effort was thus made to bring the case within the
orthodox voluntary undertaking principles. The plaintiff's case
cannot be made to fit this bed, however, without changing the requirements for this exception as established in nonhospital contexts.
The opinion maintained that after exercising any control the hospital must do everything within its power to minister to the needs of
the person. If any control was exercised, it was certainly minimal.
The 1"1anlove case more squarely presents the question at issue
here. 74 The complaint itself was based on the hospital's refusal to
treat in an emergency case. The Delaware court did not find that the
sick child was a "patient." The court emphasized that it was not
treating the case as one in which the hospital "assumed" to treat
the applicant. It treated the issue as being whether the hospital had
a duty to treat the person at all, and not whether the hospital was
negligent in the treatment it gave. Making its views quite clear, the
court held that a hospital cannot refuse aid in a medical emergency
and remanded for a determination of whether an unmistakable
emergency existed.
74. Manlove is discussed in Recent Development, Duty To Admit Emergency Patients Imposed on Private Hospital .Maintaining Emergency Ward, 62 CoLuM. L. R.Ev.
730 (1962); Recent Development, Private Hospital .Must Admit Unmistakable Emergency Cases, 14 STAN. L. R.Ev. 910 (1962); Note, Torts-Hospitals-Undertakings-Duty
of Private Hospital .Maintaining Emergency Ward To Treat in Case of Unmistakable
Emergency, 40 TEXAS L. R.Ev. 732 (1962); Recent Case, Torts-Liability of Private Hospital-Refusal of Treatment in Emergency Ward, 31 U. CrNc. L. R.Ev. 183 (1962); Case
Comment, Torts-Private Hospitals-Liability for Refusal To Provide Emergency
Treatment, 64 W. VA. L. R.Ev. 234 (1962). For a general discussion of this issue see
Note, .Must a Private Hospital Be a Good Samaritan?, 18 U. FLA. L. R.Ev. 475 (1965).
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In taking this position, the Supreme Court of Delaware rejected
the holding of the lower court which held for plaintiff on the
theory that receipt of public funds and an exemption from taxation
converted the defendant private hospital into a public hospital.
Clearly then, in Delaware the Crews rule is limited to provide only
that a hospital owes no duty to accept patients to cases of acceptance
for ordinary hospital services. In emergency cases, the applicant seeking medical aid in reliance upon a well-established custom of the
hospital to render emergency care has a right to receive such aid and
the hospital a corresponding duty. Duty and the resulting liability,
according to the Delaware court, rests on the existence of an unmistakable emergency and reliance by the prospective patient on
the hospital's custom to treat emergency cases.
This formulation may present difficulties in proving reliance
upon a custom. Perhaps fewer doctrinal difficulties would be encountered if Manlove were regarded as an expanded voluntary
undertaking case. Though the court initially rejected this approach
-no doubt to emphasize its rejection of prior cases-it later admitted the analogy of the facts to cases of negligent termination of
gratuitous undertakings, citing the predecessor of section 323 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts. Such a rationale involves an expansion of the voluntary undertaking concept as applied in prior cases.
Prior cases, especially the O'Neill case, went to great lengths to find
an undertaking to provide aid to the particular prospective patient.
In Manlove, the term means an undertaking to provide aid in all
emergency cases in general for which a refusal in any particular case
would constitute a breach of duty. There could be no reliance on an
undertaking under the prior cases until the particular prospective
patient presented himself for treatment and the hospital in some
way indicated an intention to treat him. This explains the attempts
of courts to find that the hospital exercised some kind of control over
the person or that the person had legally become a patient. Clearly,
Manlove goes further.
Such an expanded concept of undertaking may be a step other
courts would be reluctant to take, but it is also true that few cases
have arisen that could not be neatly fitted within an orthodox exception to the old rule of no duty. The Manlove court's emphasis
upon an established custom is most likely an attempt to state a
requirement of reasonable reliance by the prospective patient upon
the general undertaking. The Restatement (Second) of Torts makes
liability for harm caused by an undertaking to provide aid depend
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upon increased risk or reliance.711 And, reasonable reliance must be
based upon a sufficient undertaking by the defendant. Reliance may
be thought reasonable in a case like Manlove, because the expense
required to open an emergency room is sufficient indication of serious intent to undertake to render aid in medical emergencies.
Opening an emergency facility, however, hardly amounts to either
contract or a gratuitous promise when viewed from the position of
the hospital, and it is certainly not an "undertaking" as that term is
used in the Restatement.
Ill.

THE LAW AND SOCIETAL ATTITUDES

There is a striking divergence between the general rules of law
relating to the provision of emergency medical service by hospitals
and the general consensus of lay and professional opinion. The rationale supporting the general rule that there is no duty to act is in conflict with the generally accepted conception of the role of the modern
hospital. Further, the result permitted by the rule is felt to be shocking and morally reprehensible by all, apparently, except the legally
trained. We have already noted that some courts, reflecting this dissatisfaction, have been able to permit recovery by skirting but still
rendering homage to the rule.
The most convincing justification for the general rule is the protection of individualism. The common-law courts, following their
highly individualistic philosophy, refused to force men to be unselfish or to require them to be Good Samaritans.76 Individualistic
values are undeniably basic to Anglo-American law, but more important to contemporary American society is the value and worth of
human life. The development of modern American hospitals has
been spurred more by this human concern than by selfishness or
profit.77
75. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 (1965). If reliance is the basis of the duty
and consequent recovery, some nasty complications may be lurking as to the amount
of damages recoverable. Awards may be limited to the harm actually caused by the
reliance only. A similar problem is presented when a promise is enforced under § 90
of the Restatement of Contracts, where a recovery may be limited to the reliance
damage. 14 STAN. L. REv. 910, 915 (1962).
76. See Note, The Failure To Rescue: A Comparative Study, 52 CoLUM, L. REv. 631
(1952).
77, M, MACEACHERN, HOSPITAL ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT ch. 1 (1957); MOD·
ERN CONCEPrS OF HOSPITAL ADMINISTRATION ch. 1 ij. Owen ed. 1962); Faxon, The Place
of the Hospital in the Social Order, in THE HOSPITAL IN CONTEMPORARY LIFE ch. 8
(N. Faxon ed. 1949); Goldwater, Concerning Hospital Origins, in THE HosPITAL IN
MODERN SoCIETY ch. I, § I (A. Bachmeyer 8e G. Hartman eds. 1943).
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Such motives as philanthropy, sympathy, charity, and compassion
are almost universally accepted as underlying the founding and operation of hospitals. The hint of a profit motive in hospital operation
has been particularly subject to criticism from members of the medical profession.78 Considering hospitals as created for service to society,
one doctor wrote that "(t)he public servant, institutional or individual, who reveals for an instant a selfish aim is instantly discredited .
. . . Surely we may look fonvard to the day when all hospitals shall
present to society harmonious, united service, adopted with the
greatest care and in absqlute unselfishness to the needs of the time." 70
If most hospitals are motivated by such ideals, as experience would
suggest, it is peculiarly inappropriate to attribute to them a desire
to refuse emergency medical aid to those in need of care.
There are factual differences between hospitals and other business
institutions which may support a different legal rule in medical
emergency situations. The profit motive-incorporating a notion of
absolute managerial discretion to deal with all parties so as to ma.ximize profits-is at the heart of private enterprise and is the great
stimulus to efficiency and improved service. When a business enterprise ceases to be profitable, it generally liquidates and retires from
the business scene. A hospital cannot quit so easily. Its worth to the
community is not measured by net earnings, but by the quantity and
quality of services which it renders. 80 While some would argue that
profit seeking would force hospitals to be more efficient, it has been
deplored as an organizational objective for hospitals and criticized
as an obstacle to improvement in the quality of medical care. 81 The
plain fact is that not even the private hospital operates or is regarded
as an ordinary private business where unfettered managerial discretion is required. If unable to support itself with income from patients
who pay for their services, even the private hospital does not usually
close; it is supported by the community through private and public
assistance. With the profit motive and its concomitant need for
managerial discretion inapplicable, then, the way is open to impose
upon hospitals some sort of duty to act in emergency situations.
More indicative of the special role which the hospital plays in the
community is the position of many members of the medical profession who speak in terms of the public's right to a coordinated, com78. See HOSPITALS, DOCTORS, AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 293-94 CT. Knowles ed. 1965).
79. The Hospital in Modern Society, supra note 77, at 17.
80. Id., ch. 1, § 4.
81. HOSPITALS, DOCTORS, AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST, supra note 79, at 293-94.
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munity-wide program for the best possible medical services, including adequate provision for emergency patients. 82 To speak in these
terms is to recognize the oven\Thelming importance to our society of
emergency medical services. Indeed, because of this important role,
there has been some consideration given to the suggestion that hospitals be regulated as public utilities. 83 Hospitals certainly possess
some of the characteristics of public utilities: they characteristically
enjoy monopolistic positions in many communities and provide services in which the public has a tremendous interest. A recent sociological study of community hospitals concluded that effective hospital
medical care and treatment is possible only with the mobilization of
total community effort. 84 As the authors suggest, this effort may be
better mobilized in the form of public-utility-style regulation of
striking practical differences.
It appears, then, that the values associated with the origin of
hospitals as well as the best principles of their operation are in conflict with the values traditionally thought appropriate in the context
of a fortuitous encounter between two men, one in need of emergency aid and the other having power to give it. Today, the hospital,
particularly the emergency room, is vital to the community; it cannot be characterized as the locus of a chance encounter. A rule which
evolved in the context of independent medical practitioners-and
which today is criticized even in that context-should not be applied
to hospitals automatically and without consideration.
Beyond these criticisms of the no-duty rule's rational underpinnings, many, especially those without legal training, feel that the
rule permits a morally reprehensible result. It permits hospitals
arbitrarily to refuse aid in emergency cases, even though the hospital
personnel recognize that they have a moral duty to provide facilities
and care in such cases. 85 Surely it is the general recognition and discharge of this duty by the hospitals that accounts for the relatively
few reported cases on denial of treatment. Hospital officials and administrators are acutely aware of the censure they face if their doors
are closed to those in need. Aside from the risk of potential litiga82. Compare Stichter, Medical Staffing of Emergency Rooms: Legal and Ethical
Considerations, 62 THE Omo STATE MEDICAL J. 600-601, and Faxon, supra note 77,
ch. 8, with HOSPITALS, DocroRS, AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST, supra note 78, at 293.
83. Horty, When Hospital Has Emergency Room It May Be Required To Give
Treatment, 96 THE MODERN HOSPITAL, 103 (1961).
84. I. BELKNAP&: J. STEINLE, THE COMMUNITY AND !TS HOSPITALS (1963).
85. MODERN CONCEPTS OF HOSPITAL .ADllnNISTRATION 330 CT. Owen ed. 1962).
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tion, 86 any such denial of emergency service may have a substantial
adverse effect on the hospital's public image. 87
More than half a century ago, Professor Bohlen wrote that "it
should not be forgotten that a system of law which lags too far behind the universally received conceptions of abstract justice, in the
end must lose the sympathy, the confidence, perhaps even the respect
of the community." 88 The fact that not only the public, but also
those most intimately concerned with the operation of hospitals, feel
that hospitals should provide emergency aid to those in distress argues
eloquently for imposing a legal duty. At times, it seems the only ones
who have anything to say for the no-duty principle are the lawyers
and judges. Further, if it is true, as Holmes wrote, that the law is a
prediction of what judges will do, then the no-duty rule may no
longer be the law in the hospital emergency room context. All modern cases fall into the exceptions, and the only support for the no-duty
principles is in dicta and secondary authorities.
IV.

SOME .ALTERNATIVE PROPOSALS

Many years ago, one of the great men of American law proposed
a general rule-to be enforced by criminal penalties as well as civil
liability-requiring that aid be given to those in peril.89 The liability would attach to anyone failing to interfere to save another
from imminent death or great bodily harm when he might do so
with little or no inconvenience to himself, if death or great harm did
follow as a consequence of his inaction. Although American jurisdictions have failed to adopt this proposal, 90 it is significant that other
countries, especially in Europe, have created such statutory duties,
generally enforceable by criminal penalties. 91
86. 2 UNIVERSITY OF PITISBURGH HEALTH LAw CENTER, HOSPITAL LAw MANUAL 7-8
(1961):
Since the risk of incurring liability is much greater than the inconvenience or cost
of furnishing such treatment, it is suggested that the hospital furnish the necessary care routinely so as to insure the exercise of reasonable conduct and not
aggravate the condition•••• It is in the hospital's interest to prevent suits from
arising out of emergency room situations by furnishing routine care to minimize
injury and prevent harm.
87. Davis, Hospitals Neglect Public Relations Aspects of Emergency Department,
102 THE MODERN HOSPITAL 10 (1964); Horty, supra note 83, at 106, 159; Seifert &:
Johnstone, Meeting the Emergency Department Crisis, 40 HOSPITALS 55, 57 (1966).
88. Bohlen, The Moral Duty To Aid Others as a Basis of Tort Liability, 56 U. PA.
L. REv. 316, 337 (1908).
89. Ames, Law and Morals, 22 HARV. L. REv. 97, 113 (1902).
90. w. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 336; Seavey, I Am Not l\Jy Guest's
Keeper, 13 VAND. L. REv. 699 (1960).
91. Criminal penalties in the form of a fine or imprisonment are the normal sane•
tion, though in some instances civil remedies are available. See Note, Failure To
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In the United States, only Illinois has imposed a specific
statutory obligation on both public and private hospitals to render
emergency aid.92 The Illinois statute imposes a fine on the defendant
hospital for each offense.93 The selection of criminal over civil sanctions reflects the strong policy considerations favoring such a duty
to render aid. The duty created is specifically and narrowly limited
to hospitals where surgical operations are performed; it arises only
when emergency treatment or first aid is needed in case of injury or
acute medical conditions. This limitation deserves special note.
Unlike Professor Ames' proposal-discussed at the outset of this
section--or the European laws, the Illinois statute does not create a
general affirmative duty upon all citizens to aid those in peril. The
duty to aid created by this statute avoids some of the objections that
have been raised to a general affirmative duty: (1) that it is too difficult to single out which person should be liable when many people
could have assisted; (2) that it is too difficult to delineate all the circumstances in which a duty to aid would arise; (3) that the law
should not enforce unselfishness; and (4) that such a duty would
impose a form of slavery and infringe on individual freedom, which
is fundamental in our society.94
The first objection is obviously inapplicable to the Illinois statute.
There is only one possible defendant: a hospital which refuses emerRescue: A Comparative Study, 52 CoLUM. L. REv. 631 (1952); Note, Must a Private
Hospital Be a Good Samaritan?, 18 U. FLA. L. REv. 475 (1965). Belgian, Danish, Dutch,
French, German, Italian, Norwegian, Polish, Portuguese, Rumanian, Swiss, and Turkish codes contain or have contained such statutes. See Dawson, Negotiorum Gestio:
The Altruistic Intermeddler, 74 HARV. L. REv. 1073 (1961).
92. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 111½, §§ 86-87 (1966). Section 86 reads as follows:
No hospital, either public or private, where surgical operations are performed,
operating in this State shall refuse to give emergency medical treatment or first
aid to any applicant who applies for the same in case of injury or acute medical
condition where the same is liable to cause death or severe injury or serious
illness.
It was first enacted in 1927 and amended in 1963. A Pennsylvania statute requires all
hospitals to have at least one licensed physician or resident intern on call at all times,
but neither emergencies nor any duty to render aid is mentioned. The sanction is the
withholding of funds by the Department of Public Welfare. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35,
§§ 435-36 (196!).
93. The fine is small: "not less than $50.00 nor more than $200.00." ILL. REv. STAT.
ch. Ill½, § 87 (1966). Presumably civil liability could also be founded upon a breach
of the duty. The only case citing this section was a civil case in which a hospital successfully sued a township for services provided an indigent, the court citing this
statute as creating a duty to provide the services, thereby making prompt payment by
the governmental unit proper under another statute. St. John's Hosp. v. Town of
Capitol, 75 Ill. App. 2d 222, 226, 220 N.E.2d 333, 335 (App. Ct. 1966).
94. The arguments are summarized in Note, Moral Challenge to the Legal Doctrine
of Rescue, 14 CLEv.-MAR. L. REv. 334, 350 (1965). For a discussion of arguments for
and against general affirmative duties see Note, Must a Private Hospital Be a Good
Samaritan?, 18 U. FLA. L. REv. 475, 486 (1965).
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gency aid. The second objection is similarly inapplicable. The concern is not with all circumstances in which a duty may arise, but only
with a "medical emergency" in the hospital emergency room. It is
no real objection that this will require the courts to distinguish
between emergencies and nonemergencies: courts make analogous
distinctions in almost every case on the docket. In fact, medical
evidence should make performance of this task more precise than in
many other types of cases and the traditional reasonable man standard so familiar to the courts in so many other negligence situations
would seem apt. The third and fourth objections seem inappropriate
as applied to corporate or governmental enterprises, which most
hospitals are. In the hospital context these two objections amount
to a claim of the right to absolute managerial discretion that is certainly open to dispute.
The general rule that the hospital owes no duty to aid in a medical emergency undoubtedly emanated from the companion principle
that a physician is under no duty to give medical aid even in an
emergency. 95 The third and fourth objections are more tenable when
directed to the question of whether an individual physician is to be
regarded by the law as a public utility who must enter into contracts
and render his services irrespective of his own wishes. There are
many distinctions that may properly be made between a hospital
that maintains an emergency room and the typical physician, even
when he is in his own office. We need not enslave practicing physicians in order to require hospitals to be the Good Samaritans their
emergency room signs and public image proclaim them to be.
Such a narrowly limited statute, then, seems to stand up well
against the traditional arguments and has a good deal to recommend
it. In the absence of this sort of statute, however, can the hospital be
found liable within the rubrics of common-law tort? To hold a
hospital liable for failure to confer a benefit may seem to violate the
generally accepted definition of tort: an injury inflicted upon one
person by the act of another, which act was intended or could reasonably be calculated to result in harm. 96 This definition, however,
is today not exclusive; the law of torts already requires that some
95. E.g., Butterworth v. Swint, 53 Ga. App. 602, 186 S.E. 770 (1936); Hurley v.
Eddingfield, 156 Ind. 416, 59 N.E. 1058 (1901); Childers v. Frye, 201 N.C. 42, 158 S.E.
744 (1931); McCoid, The Care Required of Medical Practitioners, 12 VAND. L. REv.
549 (1959).
96. Prof. Bohlen suggested that the term "tort" should have been limited to acts of
this nature. Bohlen, The Moral Duty To Aid Others As a Basis of Tort Liability, 56
U. PA. L. REv. 217, 221-22 (1908).
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acts be done. Because of this dual nature of tort law, it is important
to review the relationship between affirmative legal duties and misfeasance torts in considering whether the law should require hospitals
to render emergency treatment.
The early English common law had no logical classification of
legal rights and obligations. Litigants were compelled to fit their
claims into the procedural forms of trespass or trespass on the case.
Many rights and duties with logically different attributes were, consequently, indiscriminately classified as torts. Only because of their
commercial importance did the affirmative duties today classified as
contracts become a distinct branch of law. Bohlen felt that many
other affirmative duties should likewise have been separated from
the body of tort law.97 This would have avoided the confusion and
unfortunate decisions resulting from the failure to identify the salient
features of different legal rights and obligations and the considerations underlying them. Professor Bohlen proposed that at least
the duties to take positive action be given the status of a distinct
class within tort law. This class would be subdivided into four
groups: (1) obligations created by statute; (2) obligations arising from
family relationships; (3) obligations attached by custom as an incident to tenure of real estate, or incumbency of office; and (4)
obligations "annexed by the policy of the law as necessary incidents
to a relation voluntarily assumed ...." 98 Any common-law duty upon
hospitals to provide medical aid in emergencies must be "annexed by
the policy of the law," and, therefore, falls in Bohlen's last category.
Affirmative duties created by legal policy share important characteristics that serve to distinguish the group and to limit its expansion. First, they are similar to contract duties. Although not specifically agreed to by the parties, volition at some stage on the part of
the obligated party is essential to the creation of the duty. The voluntary relationship of master and servant, for example, imposes upon
the master an obligation to provide a safe place to work and safe
equipment to use.99 Significantly, the employer is also obliged to
render emergency medical assistance to employees injured on the
job and unable to care for themselves.100 Similarly, a voluntary intervention to render emergency aid may impose a duty to render all the
aid needed by the imperiled victim, as where the intervention causes
97. Id. at 222·226.
98. Id. at 226.
99. E.g., Palmer v. Julian, 161 Kan. 619, 170 P.2d 813 (1946).
100. E.g., Szabo v. Pennsylvania R.R., 132 N.J.L. 331, 40 A.2d 562 (Ct. Err.&: App.
1945).
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the victim to forgo other sources of aid.101 Second, a necessary basis
for the duty is always the ability of one to afford the protection and
the helpless inability of the other to protect himself. 102 Consequently,
the potential beneficiary of the duty necessarily relies upon the obliged party-"necessarily" either as a result of the beneficiary's inability to help himself or of his failure to help himself because of
ignorance of facts known to or controlled by the party obliged.103
The relation of hospital and emergency patient seems "voluntarily assumed" by the hospital when one considers the total context.
The hospital has voluntarily established an emergency facility and
voluntarily made its existence known to the public. While this
may not be the degree of specific volition required in some other
relationships, it is done with the knowledge of the common understanding and growing belief that the emergency room is there for
the benefit of the public-that there may be a right to such care.
Further, the "policy of the law" would be served by creating a legal
obligation for hospitals with emergency rooms to care for those who
seek aid. It translates into law a moral obligation that is almost unanimously recognized. It would give legal support to the importance of
the individual human being by preventing needless loss of life or
needless impairment of productive capacity.
It seems altogether appropriate, then, to propose that a duty
should be imposed by law upon hospitals that maintain emergency
rooms to render treatment to all persons seeking emergency aid. Any
hospital negligently failing in this duty should incur civil liability
to the extent of the damage caused by the failure to treat. The standard for this negligence liability ought to be that emergency aid
which ordinary, reasonable, and prudent hospital employees would
have provided. 104
101. REs'l'ATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323, comment c, at 137 (1965).
102. Bohlen referred to the obliged party as the one "having exclusive control of
the cause of harm." Bohlen, supra note 96 at 233. In a strict sense the hospital has no
relation to the cause of harm in a typical emergency room case. As in other cases of
detrimental reliance, however, there is a refined sense in which the hospital does
have control over harm from aggravation: but for the hospital's false inducement of
reliance the harm from aggravation might have been avoided.
103. The two characteristics mentioned here are discussed by Bohlen. Id. at 228-29.
104. The tort liability of hospitals ordinarily depends on agency principles, with
the employee being primarily liable for his breach of duty, and the hospital being
secondarily liable. In many hospitals the physician in the emergency room may be a
member of the medical staff who is not an employee of the hospital and whose tortious
conduct may not be imputed to the hospital. This may mean in such cases that the
physician alone and not the hospital will be liable for breaching the proposed duty.
If the governing board of the hospital had adopted a policy resulting in violations of
the proposed duty then this would be a so-called "corporate" tort, though the distinc•
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Lawyers, however, require a theory acceptable under commonlaw principles that will accommodate this duty. The absence of
the duty at the present time only reflects the traditional inertia of
the law and not a lack of legal theories to supply an acceptable solution.1011 Indeed, Manlove suggests two theories which could support
the duty to treat: the public utility theory and the reliance theory.106
The lower court in Manlove followed the first approach, basing
a quasi-public character upon tax exemptions and state subsidies to
the private hospital. The public character would obviously be present
in a public hospital. Once this status is conferred, it is an easy
step to find a duty to serve all members of the public desiring their
public or private hospital emergency room services.107 But there are
several problems with this theory. The test for "public utility" status
generally has not been dependent upon public financial support but
upon whether or not the business is sufficiently impressed with a
public interest. 108 While there is some correlation between public
support and public interest, many subsidized groups such as farmers,
churches, and charities are not public utilities, and some public
utilities are not subsidized, such as telephone and telegraph companies. More important, however, is the objection that the public
utility theory would create conceptual difficulties in the application
of other rules of hospital law; these difficulties could be avoided by
alternative theories.100
Probably the most appropriate legal theory is reliance upon a
voluntary undertaking. The Delaware Supreme Court in Manlove
used this theory, expanding it in the process to permit mere reliance
upon a custom of treating all emergencies. Perhaps the element of
custom was included because the early case of Erie R.R. Co. v.
Stewart 110 indicated that reliance must be upon an established
tion seems meaningless when it is considered that the principal (hospital corporation)
is still being held liable for the acts of its agents (directors or trustees) on the basis
of what must be an imputation.
105. It was suggested earlier that nearly all emergency room cases can be explained
by the rule imposing liability upon one who negligently performs a voluntary undertaking to provide emergency care and thereby increases the harm or risk of harm to
the patient.
106. Wilmington Gen. Hosp. v. Manlove, 53 Del. 338, 169 A.2d 18, afj'd on other
grounds, 54 Del. 15, 174 A.2d 135 (1961).
107. Cf. Town of Wickenberg v. Sabin, 68 Ariz. 75, 200 P.2d 342 (1948).
108. E.g., Austin Bros. Transfer Co. v. Bloom, 316 Ill. 435, 147 N.E. 387 (1925).
109. For example, why should the duty to treat be limited to the emergency room
under this theory? Other matters of policy now controlled by the hospital board of
trustees would be subject to the same analysis.
110. 40 F.2d 855 (6th Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 843 (1930).
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custom. A more desirable formulation, however, would require only
"reasonable reliance." 111 In the hospital emergency room context
reasonable reliance should not require proof of a custom of treating
all emergencies. The allocation of scarce hospital resources to an
emergency service should be sufficient to induce any prudent man
reasonably to believe that the emergency room would perform and
not refuse the service for which it was established.
Other theories which might appear to be appropriate, such as the
invitor-invitee principles of tort law112 or the contract doctrine of
promissory estoppel, have significant conceptual limitations. The
former requires the occupier of land to come to the aid of a business
invitee needing emergency assistance.U3 This duty to an invitee is
usually justified on the basis of the economic benefit that the occupier expects to gain from the association.114 The overriding aspect
of the relationship between emergency room and prospective patient that calls for a similar rule, however, is not the probable benefit
to the hospital, but the potential detriment to the patient growing
out of his reasonable reliance. Not many emergency services can be
regarded as a potential bonanza of economic benefit. On the other
hand, it might be argued that a hospital with medical facilities should
be under no less an obligation than a department store with little or
none.
The promissory estoppel theory has even less appeal. It is essentially a contractual mechanism for shifting the burden of loss.115
When invoked, promissory estoppel functions as a substitute for
consideration, not as a substitute for a promise. Thus, it holds a
promisor to an actual promise and is not used to imply a promise for
111. Requiring emergency room to treat all emergencies should not cause undue
concern among hospital administrators over their normal operating practices. ,vith
a reasonable reliance limitation it would be permissible to operate an emergency
room on a limited schedule if limited resources prohibit twenty-four hour coverage.
Horty, When a Hospital Starts Emergency Care It Must Provide the Best Service It
Can, 96 THE MODERN HOSPITAL II6, 165 (1961). The hospital, however, would be responsible for informing the public of its limited operation by posting emergency
room hours on entrance signs, in telephone listings, and in other public advertisements. Any restrictions on the type of emergency service provided should be clearly
publicized to prevent the public from relying upon the hospital for general emergency
room services. A specialty hospital providing emergency service only in its medical
specialty, for example, should take reasonable steps to make this known to the
public. Horty, supra note 83, at 105.
II2. This approach has been mentioned in 2 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH HEAI.rn
LAw CENTER, HosPITAL LAw MANUAL 7 (1961) and Note, Must a Private Hospital Be a
Good Samaritan?, 18 U. FLA. L. REv. 475, 482 (1965).
ll3. L. S. Ayres &: Co. v. Hicks, 220 Ind. 86, 40 N.E.2d 334 (1942); R.EsrATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 314(A)(3) (1965); w. PROSSER, supra note 90, at 337.
114. W. PROSSER, supra note 90, at 396.
115. R.EsrATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 90, illustration 2, at 111 (1932).
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the sake of creating liability.116 In emergency room situations like
those in O'Neill and Manlove, the need to imply a promise to give
the service negates the applicability of this doctrine.
Selecting the appropriate theory does not, however, answer all
the questions. Should there be strict liability for failure to treat an
emergency? This would mark a radical shift from the present state
of the law. If not strict liability, what kind of effort will satisfy the
duty and avoid liability based on negligence principles? The proposed duty involves the treatment of medical emergencies only. If
there is no duty to treat nonemergencies, there must be some legally
acceptable procedure for distinguishing emergency from nonemergency cases. Another legal problem is to decide what due care
requires to satisfy the duty to identify and treat the emergency
cases. Obviously, the large general hospital in an urban center is in
a different situation than a small local hospital, but how much should
the law take individual circumstances into account? Are there not
minimum requirements that due care demands from all hospitals
maintaining emergency rooms?
Because of the tremendous importance emergency medical care
has among the total array of medical services, the law should not
sanction any degree of care below that generally prevailing for other
medical services. Perhaps hospitals should be required to adopt that
procedure which will assure that emergency cases are handled with
the degree of care and skill which an ordinary, reasonable, and
prudent licensed physician would exercise under similar circumstances. The standards for emergency departments formulated by
the medical profession itself call for diagnosis of emergency room
cases by licensed physicians only. 117 It would be entirely appropriate
for the courts to apply this as a legal standard.118 There is also much
to be said for creating this proposed duty by statute. The process of
adjudication is too slow, and the uncertainties need to be removed.
V.

CONCLUSION

There is no longer any basis for failing to require that emergency
medical aid be rendered by hospitals with emergency facilities to
116. Bard v. Kent, 19 Cal. 2d 449, 112 P.2d 8 (1942); IA A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 200 (1963).
117. Standards for Emergency Department in Hospital, 48 BuLL. OF AM. COLLEGE
OF SURGEONS 112 (May-June 1963). The same standard is dearly implied in T. FLINT,
EMERGENCY TREATMENT AND l\!ANAGEIIIENT 88 (3d ed. 1964).
118. In Darling v. Charleston Hosp., 33 Ill. 2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253 (1965), the
Illinois Supreme Court gave legal recognition to the Standards of the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals.
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those in need of such care. Not even the old cases cited in support of
a lack of duty really support that position, and all the newer cases
have found detours around the obstacle easily. Hospital personnel
quite generally assume that there is a duty, and the public makes
the same assumption. The law should not continue to honor such
an outworn, unpopular, and barbaric dictum as the one permitting
the professional "Good Samaritan" to keep its doors closed to the
victim of a medical emergency.

